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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA BETH BARKER, and 
the STATE OF UTAH, 
Department of Human 
Services, 
Plaintiffs/Appellees, 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930587-CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-2a-3(2)(h) and 78-45-10 (1993). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes and rules are contained 
in the Addendum: 
34-34-2 (1993) 
34-34-6 (1993) 
62A-9-114(l) (Supp. 1994) 
62A-11-106 (Supp. 1994) 
62A-11-302 (1992) 
62A-ll-303(3) (1992) 
62A-ll-304.2(3) (Supp. 1994) 
63-46b-l(2)(1) (1993) 
78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1994) 
78-45-7 (Supp. 1994) 
78-45-9(1)(a) (Supp. 1994) 
78-45-10 (1993) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Mr. Barker ("Appellant") has listed thirty-nine issues in 
his brief, however, in the view of the State of Utah, Department 
of Human Services ("Appellee"), a number of his enumerated issues 
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are either redundant or inclusive of several major issues. 
Therefore, Appellee has categorized Appellant's issues under 
three major issues. 
1. Whether the lower court determination of contempt of 
court for Appellant's failure to pay child support and order 
requiring him to immediately serve thirty days in jail for this 
contempt violated provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah 
Constitution and/or Utah law. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law which this 
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's determination. Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 
P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990) . 
2. Whether the lower court findings of fact are sufficient 
to support its order of a judgment of child support arrearages 
against Appellant. 
Standard of Review: Findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 
52(a). Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
3. Whether the lower court's order of a judgment against 
Appellant for child support arrearages violates provisions of the 
U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution and/or Utah law. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which this 
court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial 
court's determination. Carter v. Utah Power & Light Co., 800 
P.2d 1095 (Utah 1990) . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A Decree of Divorce and Order of Support dated June 8, 1987 
and signed by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs of the District Court of 
Sanpete County, Sixth Judicial District awarded Laura Beth Barker 
("Ms. McGillivray") a divorce from Appellant, awarded custody of 
the parties five children to Ms. McGillivray and ordered child 
support to be paid by the Appellant in the amount of $100.00 per 
child. (R.341-347). The order further provided that the child 
support obligation would increase to $150.00 per month for four 
of the children for a total of $600.00, when the eldest child 
reached eighteen. (R.343). The eldest child was born April 21, 
1970. (R.323). 
Based upon the above-stated order of support, Appellee filed 
with the District Court a Motion for an Order to Show Cause dated 
February 3, 1993. (R.603-604). Pursuant to this Motion, the 
District Court in an order dated February 4, 199 3, ordered 
Appellee to appear and show cause in pertinent part as to the 
following: 1) why judgment should not be entered against him in 
the sum of $13,050.00 for unpaid child support from March 1, 1991 
through January 31, 1993; 2) why he should not be required to pay 
$600.00 per month ongoing child support commencing February 1, 
1993; 3) why he should not be required to make all payments in 
this matter to Appellee; and 4) why he should not be held in 
contempt of court for failure to make child support payments as 
previously ordered by the court. (R.605-606). 
On February 26, 1993, Appellant filed a Counterclaim for 
3 
Abuse of Process and Harassment and Petition for Change of 
Circumstances. (R.616-619). The Court treated these filings as 
a Petition to Modify. (R.788 p. 8-9).l Appellant alleged, in 
substance, that: 1) the State had no jurisdiction over him; 2) 
this matter had already been litigated by this court; 3) the 
State violated his due process rights by not notifying him that 
Ms. McGillivray was receiving public assistance; 4) his support 
payment should be modified because of a change in circumstances; 
and 5) the State was guilty of abuse of process and harassment. 
(R.616-619). 
The Appellee denied Appellant's allegations and asked the 
court to dismiss Appellant's Petition in its Answer to 
Appellant's Petition to Modify filed April 6, 1993. (R.628-631). 
Subsequently, Appellant filed three additional Petitions to 
Modify in which he asserted virtually identical allegations to 
those set forth in his previous petition filed February 26, 1993. 
These petitions were filed on April 16, 1993 (R.634-640), May 26f 
1993 (R.669-671), and June 9, 1993 (R.681-684). 
The Appellee's Motion and Order to Show Cause and 
Appellant's Motions were heard by the Honorable Louis G. Trevort 
on June 30, 1993. (R.788 p. 3). After the hearing, the Court 
issued a bench ruling. (R.788 p. 122-123). The court ruled that 
Appellee was entitled to a $13,050.00 judgment against Appellant 
LThe lower court did not properly number the record. 
Specifically, the transcript is only numbered on the cover page. 
So, throughout Appellee's brief, when a citation is needed to the 
transcript, we will cite R.788 for the transcript and the specific 
number of the page in the transcript. 
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for unpaid child support for the period of March 1, 1991 through 
January 31, 1993. (R.788 p. 122-123). The court dismissed 
Appellant's Petition to Modify and found Appellant in contempt of 
court for failure to fulfill his support obligation, thereby 
ordering him to serve thirty days in the Sanpete County Jail, 
beginning at the time of the hearing. (R.788 p.122-123). 
On July 16, 1993, the trial court entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.722-728) as well as its Judgment 
and Order in which the court basically reiterated its bench 
ruling. (R.729-732). 
Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and Relief from 
Judgment or Order on July 13, 1993, in which Appellant claimed, 
in relevant part, that his due process rights were violated 
because he was denied court appointed counsel. (R.708-716). The 
Court, in a Judgment and Order entered August 19, 1993, denied 
Appellant's request for court appointed counsel, request for a 
new trial, and request for relief from the judgment and order. 
(R.749-751). 
On September 23, 1993, Appellant filed his Notice of Appeal, 
appealing the lower court's judgment and order entered July 16, 
199 3 and its post-judgment and order entered August 19, 1993. 
(R.756). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Decree of Divorce and Order of Support dated June 8, 
1987, entered by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, the court determined 
that it has and retains jurisdiction over the Appellant. (R.330-
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331). Specifically, the court found that the Appellant is no 
different under the law than any other citizen of the State of 
Utah or the United States of America that might appear before the 
court. There is no distinction of citizen by classification, 
therefore the Appellant can claim no special status by reason of 
special citizenship classification. (R.723). Furthermore, 
Appellant's failure to participate in the Social Security system 
is not a basis for claiming special treatment or citizenship 
status. (R.723). The Appellant did not appeal this 
determination and the time for appeal has expired. 
Additionally, in the Decree of Divorce and Judgment, Judge 
Tibbs ordered Appellant to pay $150.00 per month child support 
per child, totalling $600.00 per month. (R.343). The payments 
were to be made to Appellee so long as Ms. McGillivray received 
public assistance. (R.343). Public assistance has been provided 
for Appellant's minor children. (R.788 p. 33, R.600). Appellant 
did not make any child support payments either to Appellee or Ms. 
McGillivray during the period of March 1, 1991 through January 
31, 1993. (R.788 p. 33). 
At the time of the Decree of Divorce, the Appellant was 
capable of earning $1,500.00 per month. (R.343, R.788 p. 29). 
At the time of the June 30, 1993 hearing, appellant had a 
capacity to earn in excess of $2,000.00 per month based upon his 
educational training and work history. (R.788 p. 48-49). 
Appellant did not have any medical evidence to support any claim 
of medical disability. (R.788 p. 50). 
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The Appellant owes child support for the period March 1, 
1991 through January 31, 1993 in the amount of $13,050.00. 
(R.726). Based upon this failure to pay child support Appellant 
was immediately sentenced to thirty days in the Sanpete County 
Jail. (R.728) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant makes sixteen separate arguments against the trial 
court and Appellee. For a majority of these arguments, the 
cases, statutes and constitutional provisions cited by Appellant 
are irrelevant and/or misinterpreted. Furthermore, an additional 
number of his arguments are totally unsound and frivolous in that 
they are not based upon any evidence or authority. 
Appellant has a fundamental misunderstanding of the State 
child support enforcement laws and procedures. Appellee is 
statutorily authorized by law to enforce Appellant's child 
support obligation and the lower court's Findings of Fact and 
Order are consistent with this statutory framework. 
Additionally, Appellant challenges the contempt order of the 
lower court on the basis that he was entitled to legal counsel 
and none was appointed to him prior to incarceration. The 
contempt order of the court was civil in nature and so the 
challenge of the Appellant is without merit. Furthermore, even 
if there is merit, the issue is now moot. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLEE IS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED TO DIRECTLY COLLECT 
FROM AN OBLIGOR MONIES EXPENDED THROUGH PUBLIC 
ASSISTANCE PROVIDED FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN. 
The points in Appellant's Brief clearly indicate that 
Appellant has a fundamental misunderstanding of the State's child 
support enforcement laws and procedure. 
The Office of Recovery Services is statutorily authorized to 
obtain and enforce child support orders in support actions. 
Appellant claims that the Utah Department of Human Services 
cannot be subrogated to Ms. McGillivray's rights against 
Appellant on unpaid support payments. Specifically, Appellant 
asserts that since he never contracted with the Department of 
Human Services, the State is illegally attempting to force him 
into a welfare contract. (Appellant's Brief at 25). 
This claim by Appellant that a contract with the State is a 
necessary prerequisite for the State to collect unpaid child 
support is contrary to the statutory authority which enables the 
Office of Recovery Services to obtain and enforce child support 
orders in support action. This is especially true when Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") has been provided for 
the children, Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-106 (Supp. 1994), Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-11-304.2(3) (Supp. 1994), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-
9(1)(a) (Supp. 1994) provides: 
The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor and the office may 
proceed...on behalf of the Department of 
8 
Human Services...to enforce the right to 
recovery public assistance,.. 
In Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 1976), the 
court held that where a divorced wife and her four children were 
receiving public assistance, it was proper for the Department of 
Social Services to intervene on her behalf in an action to force 
her ex-husband to make unpaid child support payments. _Id. at 
241. 
The policy and the law is...to simplify and 
expedite procedure and to avoid multiplicity 
of lawsuits. The right of children to 
support and the parental duty to provide it, 
supplemented by the State when necessary, 
gives rise to a mutual interest in [the 
problem of child support collection]...[i]t 
was [therefore] appropriate for the State to 
join as an intervenor in this action. Id. 
If a custodial parent has received AFDC for the child, the 
Office of Recovery Services has another separate, statutory 
interest in status as a party in such proceedings, i.e. as an 
assignee of the custodians right to child support for operation 
of law through execution of an actual assignment. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-45-9(1)(a), Utah Code Ann. § 62A-ll-303(3) (1992). 
Appellant also claimed that he and Appellee contracted to 
allow payment in kind and therefore the State had no authority to 
provide public assistance to his children in the first place, 
because it "forced" him into the "welfare contract." 
(Appellant's Brief at p. 25-26). Appellant's claim, however, 
rises from his misunderstanding of the purpose of the State child 
support enforcement laws. Utah Code Ann. §62A-9-114(1) (Supp. 
1994) provides: 
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children may 
be provided to families and children in 
accordance with Title IV-A of the Social 
Security Act and applicable federal 
regulations. 
A child who is not financially supported by his or her natural 
parents is instead supported by federal and state taxpayers 
through jointly funded public assistance programs such as AFDC. 
Utah Code Ann. § 62A-11-302 (1992). 
Furthermore, even if Appellant and Ms. McGillivray did agree 
to such a contract, Utah Code Ann. § 6 2A-11-106(2) provides: 
[n]o agreement between an obligee and an 
obligor, either relieving an obligation or 
purporting to settle past, present, or future 
obligations either as a settlement or 
prepayment, reduces or terminates the right 
of the office to recover from that obligor on 
the behalf of the Department for public 
assistance provided... 
Given the Appellee's clear authority to recover the public 
assistance provided for his children, the trial court's Judgment 
and Order for the Appellee is clearly based in solid statutory 
authority. 
The Appellant claims that the Appellee violated his due 
process rights by failing to notify him that his children were 
receiving public assistance. (Appellant's Brief at p. 6-7). 
Contrary to this claim, Appellee was under no duty to notify 
Appellant of this situation. Appellant cites § 63-46b-3 of the 
Utah Code for this alleged duty to notify. This provision of the 
law outlines the requirement for commencement of adjudicative 
proceedings for State agencies under the Administrative 
Procedures Act. Appellant's argument ignores the fact that there 
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was no adjudicative proceeding with respect to the determination 
of public assistance eligibility for his children and notice of 
this matter. Furthermore, even if there was an adjudicative 
proceeding this proceeding would be exempted by Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-l(2)(1) which states: 
This chapter [63-46b-l et seq.] does not 
govern: the initial determination of any 
persons eligibility for government of public 
assistance benefits. 
Appellant cites no other authority for his argument. 
Furthermore, generally regarding Appellant's due process 
arguments, as found by the trial court, the Appellant was 
afforded due process every time he was before the court. 
(R.724). Each time the State sought judgment against the 
Appellant, he was given notice of the State's claim and an 
opportunity to present his arguments in court. (R.788 p. 110). 
Therefore, Appellant's claim that he was denied due process is 
unfounded. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND PROPERLY 
DISMISSED APPELLANT'S PETITION TO MODIFY. 
The lower court considered Appellant's Counterclaim for 
Abuse of Process and Harassment and Petition for Change of 
Circumstances as a combined Petition to Modify. (R.788 p. 8-9). 
In this combined Petition to Modify, Appellant's arguments give 
rise to the issues of violation of his constitutional right to 
work, involuntary servitude, whether he is voluntarily 
underemployed, and the imputation of income to him and the 
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disallowance of a change in circumstances. 
Appellant contends that Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5 is in 
violation of the Utah Right to Work law, Utah State Constitution 
and the U.S. Constitution. In part, Appellant asserts that by 
using his "historical and current earnings" to determine whether 
he was voluntarily unemployed, the trial court violated his 
constitutionally protected right to work in an occupation of his 
choosing. (Appellant's Brief at p. 10-11), See Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-45-7.5(5)(c) , (7)(a), (7)(b); Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-2, -6. 
There is nothing in either the U.S. Constitution or the Utah 
Constitution which says that Appellant can avoid his child 
support obligation. Appellant has a right to work, however, he 
also has a child support obligation for his and Ms. McGillivray's 
five children. If he chooses to voluntarily quit a job or 
voluntarily work at a job with lesser pay, there is nothing 
unconstitutional about a court requiring him to support his 
children. None of his constitutional or state statutory 
citations are otherwise persuasive. Therefore, the trial court 
properly ruled that his constitutional arguments were unfounded. 
Furthermore, the trial court correctly determined that 
Appellant was intentionally underemployed for the purpose of 
avoiding child support obligations and therefore subject to 
imputation of income. In computing gross income, "[historical 
and current earnings shall be used to determine whether an 
underemployment or overemployment situation exists." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(5)(c) (Supp. 1994). Based upon Appellant's 
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testimony concerning his educational training, work history and 
the discrepancy between his past and his current earnings, the 
trial court properly found Appellant to be voluntarily 
underemployed. (R.788 p. 34-50). (R.725). While Appellant 
argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding 
Appellant to be intentionally underemployed, no support exists in 
the record for such an argument. 
In finding the Appellant to be intentionally underemployed 
for the purposes of avoiding child support payments, the trial 
court has the statutory authority to impute income to Appellant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-45-7.5(7)(b), 
[i]f income is imputed to a parent, the 
income shall be based upon employment 
potential and probable earnings as derived 
from work history, occupational 
qualifications and prevailing earnings for 
persons of similar backgrounds in the 
community. 
In applying these statutory factors to determine the amount of 
income to be imputed to Appellant, the trial court properly found 
Appellant to have an earning capacity of $2,000.00 per month. 
(R.788 p. 34-50). (R.725). 
In the case of Hill v. Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), the court held that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in not making specific findings of fact that ex-
husband was underemployed since he had submitted at trial to 
imputation of income and because his job history and current 
employment options supported the imputation of an amount higher 
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than the ex-husband's current salary. In the instant case, 
Appellant did not submit to imputation of income, but his job 
history and current employment situation supports the imputation 
of income. 
Additionally, the trial court was within it's discretion to 
not consider Appellant's situation a material change in 
circumstances for purposes of downward modification of his award. 
Appellant did not demonstrate that a material change in 
circumstances had occurred since the divorce. As a matter of 
fact, his situation had improved. At the time of the divorce, he 
was earning $1,500.00 per month (R.343, R.788 p. 29, 48-49) and 
the evidence at the hearing indicates he is capable of earning 
$2,000.00 per month. (R.788 p. 48-49). In the case of Grover v. 
Grover, 839 P.2d 871, 873 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the court held 
that a child support order can only be modified based upon a 
showing of a material change in circumstances. 
As a basis for his argument that the trial court failed to 
make specific and detailed findings, Appellant relies upon Ostler 
v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). His reliance, 
however, is misplaced. In Ostler the court held that the failure 
of the trial court to enter specific findings on each of the 
statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 for an 
award of prospective support after a material change of 
circumstances is generally reversible error. .Id., at 715. In the 
instant case the trial court properly found no change in 
circumstances to justify modification of the existing support 
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award, Ostler was based upon a modification of a prior award 
after the determination that a material change of circumstances 
had occurred. Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d at 715. 
Appellant also makes an argument that he is entitled to 
relief from retroactively accumulated support. This argument is 
without merit as a Petition to Modify applies to prospective 
support. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2), see Grover v. Grover, 839 
P.2d at 873). 
Appellant makes another argument that the trial court should 
have granted his Petition to Modify due to his obligations to his 
"current" family, Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial 
court erred in concluding that Appellant's obligation to support 
his natural children of this action is primary to his obligation 
to support his natural children of a subsequent common law 
marriage. (R.726). However, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2(5) 
(Supp. 1994) provides: 
[i]n a proceeding the modify the existing 
award, consideration of natural or adopted 
children other than those common to both 
parties may be applied to mitigate an 
increase in the award, but may not be applied 
to justify a decrease in the award, (emphasis 
added). 
Again, Appellant's argument is not supported by statutory 
authority. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED ON AND DENIED 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT AND ORDER. 
Appellant argues that his due process rights were violated 
because the trial court failed to rule on his Motion for Relief 
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from Judgment and Order. This argument ignores the fact that the 
trial court did issue a Judgment and Order in response to 
Appellant's Motion on August 19, 1993. (R.749-751). The trial 
court denied Appellant's request for court appointed counsel, for 
a new trial, and for relief from judgment and order dated July 
16, 1993. (R.749-751). 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER DOES NOT REVERSE A PRIOR 1991 
ORDER. 
Appellant argues that the trial court's order holding 
Appellant in contempt for non-payment of child support overturns 
the prior 1991 order in which Appellant was allowed to purge 
himself. The unpaid child support sought for the State in 1991 
was instigated to recovery unpaid support prior to the dates set 
forth in the instant case before the lower court. (R.788 p. 21). 
The previous judgment entered on April 29, ]991 does not in any 
way conflict or overturn the instant judgment for unpaid support 
for the period March 1991 through January 199 3. 
POINT V. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION 
OVER HIM IS RES JUDICATA. 
Appellant has continuously argued that the trial court does 
not have jurisdiction over him. This issue was litigated before 
Judge Tibbs in the divorce action and thus is now res judicata. 
Specifically, in the trial court's findings of fact concerning 
Appellant's and Ms. McGillivray's divorce decree dated June 8, 
1987, Judge Tibbs specifically found that the court has 
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jurisdiction over Appellant in this matter. (R.330-331). 
Furthermore, on January 5, 1989, Judge Tibbs concluded in a 
ruling on a previous Order to Show Cause brought by the State 
that the court retains jurisdiction over Appellant in this 
matter. (R.532). Thus, in this case, res judicata bars 
Appellant from contesting the court's jurisdiction as the issue 
has been previously litigated and ruled upon. See State v. 
V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) holding that res 
judicata bars defendant from claiming non-paternity because the 
court had previously entered a decree of paternity. 
POINT VI. 
APPELLANT'S CONTEMPT WAS IN THE NATURE OF CIVIL 
CONTEMPT AND HE THEREFORE WAS NOT ENTITLED TO COUNSEL 
PRIOR TO INCARCERATION, HOWEVER, EVEN IF THIS COURT 
FINDS THAT HE WAS ENTITLED TO COUNSEL, THIS ISSUE IS 
NOW MOOT. 
Appellant contends that while knowing he was indigent, the 
trial court both failed to inform him of his right to counsel and 
further, refused to grant his request for the same. (Appellant's 
Brief at p. 4). Contempt of court is an amorphous contempt and 
takes many forms and serves many purposes. Within contempt law 
there are two distinct forms of contempt - civil and criminal -
which serve two equally district purposes. Further, within civil 
and criminal contempt there are two further refinements - direct 
or indirect - which greatly effect the contemner's due process 
hearing rights.2 
2If the contempt is direct, it is committed in the presence of 
the judge and may be punished summarily without the need for a 
hearing. However, if the contempt is indirect, it is committed 
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Whether it be civil or criminal, in a contempt proceeding 
the plaintiff must allege, that in contempt of court, the 
defendant wilfully disobeyed an order of the court and must make 
a prayer that the defendant be punished therefor. In this sense, 
it is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and 
purpose that serves to distinguish between civil and criminal 
contempt. See Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range, 221 U.S. 418, 441 
(1911); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Utah 1988); 3 
Charles Wright, Federal Practice And Procedure § 704 (1982). If 
it is for civil contempt, the punishment of the court is remedial 
and for the benefit of the complainant. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 
441; Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Von 
Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168. But, if it is for criminal contempt, the 
sentence is punitive - to vindicate the court - and is limited to 
imprisonment for a definite period of time. Gompers at 441-442; 
Von Hake at 1168. 
Thus, imprisonment for civil contempt is ordered not to 
vindicate the judge, but rather because the defendant refused to 
outside the presence of the judge and due process requires that the 
contemnor be given a hearing and be able to present witnesses in 
its defense. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1169-70. The due 
process clause of the federal constitution requires that in a 
prosecution for indirect contempt, "the person charged be advised 
of the nature of the action against him, have assistance of 
counsel, if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and 
have the right to offer testimony on his behalf." Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982). 
Thus, while civil nonsupport is surely indirect contempt in 
which the defendant must be afforded the opportunity to have 
counsel present, Burgers does not answer the question of whether 
the State must appoint counsel if the defendant is unable to obtain 
such on its own. 
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perform an affirmative act required by order of the court. 
Imprisonment then is not inflicted as a punishment, but is 
intended to be remedial and to coerce the defendant to do that 
which the court has ordered. Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441-442. 
Moreover, the decree in such cases must provide the defendant 
with a "purge" condition for its contemptuous behavior and must 
hold that the defendant stand committed unless and until it 
performs the affirmative act as required by the order of the 
court. See Feiock, 485 U.S. at 624. 
In 1988, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Feiock approach 
to differentiating civil and criminal contempt as a matter of 
state law. Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1168 n.5. Thus, for all future 
cases the Utah state courts: 
will follow the rule that a contempt order is 
criminal if the fine or sentence imposes is 
fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the 
fine or imprisonment is conditional such that 
the contemnor can obtain relief from the 
contempt order merely by doing some act as 
ordered by the court. Further a contempt 
order is civil if the order is to pay a fine 
to the other party rather than to the court. 
Id. In the instant case, the contempt can be characterized as 
civil only if the order was intended to be remedial in nature and 
provided Appellant with the ability to purge himself.3 
As a general rule, non-support contempt hearings are civil 
in nature, however, if the contemnor is not presented with, or 
3While it is clear from the transcript that the contempt in 
this case began as an indirect civil contempt - based upon 
Appellant's failure to pay child support - it may be said that the 
contempt was transformed into direct contempt based upon 
Appellant's courtroom behavior. 
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does not have the ability to meet, specified purge conditions, 
the proceedings may become criminal and therefore subject to the 
due process requirements of all other criminal proceedings, 
Feiock at 632. As the significant and essential characteristic 
of civil contempt is that the penalty can be avoided by 
compliance with the court order, the ability to comply must exist 
in substance as well as in form. Murray v. Murray, 597 P.2d 
1220, 1222 (Haw. 1978). If, in fact, Appellant did not have the 
ability to comply in substance with the order to the court, the 
proceeding in the instant case was criminal in nature, and 
pursuant to holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court, he likely was 
entitled to court-appointed counsel. See Arqersinqer v. Hamlin, 
407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
In Gideon v. Wainwriqht, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, which is made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, "any person haled into court, 
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial 
unless counsel is provided to him." Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
While in Gideon, this proclamation was made solely in the context 
of state felony trials, the Court later refined its position in 
Arqersinqer v. Hamlin, supra. In Arqersinqer, the court was 
faced with the question whether persons charged with only 
misdemeanor or other petty offense equally enjoyed the right to 
assistance of counsel set forth in Gideon. In holding that such 
right could not be limited to felony cases only the court found 
that no accused may be deprived of his liberty without the aid of 
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counsel. "[A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person 
may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, 
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel." 
Arqersinqer, 407 U.S. at 37. 
In civil non-support cases, "in order to justify a finding 
of contempt and the imposition of a jail sentence, it must appear 
by clear and convincing proof that: (1) the party knew what was 
required of him; (2) that he had the ability to comply; and (3) 
that he wilfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so." 
Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 1119.(Utah 1977) (emphasis added). 
When a divorced father falls behind in his court-ordered support 
payments, the court may summon the father to show cause why he 
should not be held in contempt for his failure to pay. When no 
cause is found, the court may order a jail term. Generally, in 
such cases, the contempt is civil in nature and the jail term is 
intended only to coerce the father to perform his failure to 
perform. See Johansen v. State, 491 P.2d 759, 766 (Alaska 1971). 
Imperative in these proceedings, is the father's ability to 
comply with the order of the court. E.g., Maqqio v. Zeitz, 333 
U.S. 56, 76 (1948). The father must be presented with an 
opportunity to purge his contempt at any time and therefore 
secure his immediate release. Johansen, 491 P.2d at 7 64; 
Gompers, 221 U.S. at 442. 
The fact that a contemnor - the father - may be faced with 
the possibility of incarceration is often cited as the reason why 
the accused must be given the right to have the assistance of 
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counsel. See 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 201; Walker v. McLain, 768 
F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, it has been held that 
the right to counsel must be extended to all contempt proceedings 
- whether civil or criminal; petty or serious - as long as the 
proceedings carry a risk of imprisonment as a possible penalty. 
This rule has been applied where non-compliance with a child 
support order may result in a jail or prison sentence. However, 
the right to counsel in these cases appear to be limited to 
instances of indigence. McLain, 768 F.2d at 1181. 
According to this standard, a father may not be incarcerated 
for failure to pay court-ordered child support unless the court 
first determines that the contemnor has the present ability to 
purge himself of the contempt. In this sense, some courts have 
held that there is never a right to court-appointed counsel in a 
civil contempt proceeding for failure to pay child support 
"because if the parent has the ability to pay, there is no 
indigence, and if the parent is indigent, there is not threat of 
imprisonment." Bowen v. Bowen, 471 So.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985) 
(citing Andrews v. Walton, 428 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1983). 
To determine that court-appointed counsel is never necessary 
in civil contempt hearings, courts have relied upon the fact 
that, in contrast to criminal contempt proceedings, civil 
contempt is, by nature, remedial and coercive only. Its 
objective is compliance, not punishment. Sword v. Sword, 249 
N.W.2d 88, 9 3 (Mich. 1976). While some cases may present special 
circumstances in which counsel may be helpful, as a general rule, 
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there is no constitutional mandate requiring the appointment of 
the same...Sword, 249 N.W.2d at 93. Such courts have held, in 
most cases, civil non-support hearings are not complex. Id. 
While cases do vary and some situations may call for the 
assistance of counsel, there is no general rule requiring such a 
measure. Id. Thus, for these courts, although the defendant 
does have a strong liberty interest in remaining free from bodily 
restraint, this interest is not as strong as it would be if the 
defendant were being criminally prosecuted or charged with a 
crime. 
Similarly, in a civil contempt action, courts have found 
that the defendant has the power and ability to control its own 
destiny. Thus, courts have relied upon the fact that the 
defendant is only in risk of losing its liberty if it is proven: 
1) the defendant has the ability to comply with the court order; 
and 2) that the defendant has filed to make the necessary 
arrangements to do so. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. 
Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1102 (N.M. 1982). Conversely, however, 
other courts have found that where the defendant is indigent, it 
is quite misleading to hold that civil contempt is somehow self-
inflicted. Therefore, some courts note that it is the State, and 
not the indigent father, who holds the keys to the contemnor's 
release. Duval v. Duval, 322 A.2d 1, 3 (State 1974); In re 
Nevitt, 117 F. 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). In such cases, it is 
the State that places the contemnor in jail for failure to pay, 
and it is the State that establishes the conditions for release. 
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Duval, 322 A.2d at 3- Thus, for an indigent father who lacks the 
apparent ability to comply with the court's order, an order of 
civil contempt is no less an application of State power than is 
criminal confinement. 
In Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985), the 
court found that an indigent father who was facing incarceration 
in a civil non-support action was entitled to have court-
appointed counsel. McLain, at 1184. In so ruling, the court 
stated that "[i]t is the defendant's interest in personal 
freedom, and not simply special sixth and fourteenth amendment 
right to counsel in criminal cases, which triggers the right to 
appointed counsel." Id. at 1183 (quoting Lassiter v. Department 
of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, reh'g denied, 
453 U.S. 927 (1981)). The court further stated that it would e 
absurd to distinguish criminal from civil incarceration because, 
from the perspective of the incarcerated individual, "the jail is 
just as bleak no matter which label is used." Id. Moreover, the 
court found that the line between civil and criminal contempt is 
fine and rarely as clear as the State would suggest. Thus, the 
right to counsel, pursuant to the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment, "turns not on whether a proceeding may be 
characterized as 'criminal' or 'civil,' but on whether a 
proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty." Id. (citing 
Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
Pursuant to Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), 
the McLain court set forth the elements that must be evaluated to 
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determine the need for court-appointed counsel. These elements 
include: 1) the private interest affected by state action; 2) 
the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest without the 
assistance of counsel; and 3) the government's interest - both 
fiscal and administrative - in retaining the status quo. Id. 
The court found that in cases involving the possible 
incarceration of an indigent defendant, the defendant's 
interest - personal liberty - is one of the most important 
interests protected by the Constitution. However, where the 
defendant's incarceration may be conditional upon compliance with 
the purge condition, the court noted, that the interest personal 
liberty is not absolute. Id. at 1184. 
Thus, as the defendant's interest in personal liberty 
diminishes, so does its right to appointed counsel. Id. 
However, the court found, where the defendant is truly indigent -
where he has not ability to purge himself - his liberty interest 
is no more conditional than a criminal defendant's. That a truly 
indigent defendant may ever be incarcerated for failing to comply 
with its court-ordered support obligations, the court held, 
highlights the very need for the assistance of counsel. 
In such cases the assistance of counsel would greatly aid 
the defendant: 1) in establishing its indigence; and 2) ensuring 
that the defendant is not improperly incarcerated. Id. While 
the State has a keen interest in assuring that children are 
supported, the court found that this interest is in no way 
superior to the interest in court-appointed counsel to assist the 
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non-supporting parent to establish that its failure to pay was 
not wilful/ 
Finally, the court held due process requires, at a minimum 
"that an indigent defendant threatened with incarceration for 
civil contempt for non-support, v/ho can establish indigence under 
the normal standards for appointment of counsel in a criminal 
case, be appointed counsel to assist him in his defense." Id. at 
1185. See Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 267 (6th Cir. 1984) 
(holding the relevant question is not whether the proceeding is 
civil or criminal but whether the court intends to incarcerate -
the non-supporting defendant); Ridgway v. Baker, 740 F.2d 1409, 
1413 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding a Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
for an indigent father in a civil non-support case); Nordgren v. 
Mitchell, 716 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting, by implication, 
that there is a right to court-appointed counsel for indigent 
civil non-support defendants); Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386, 
1390 (9th Cir. 1973) (sating in dictum, that no indigent father 
may be imprisoned unless represented by counsel). Additionally, 
the court cited to several other federal court decisions which 
have uniformly established a right to court-appointed counsel in 
other types of civil contempt proceedings. U.S. v. Anderson, 583 
D.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1977) (contempt for refusing to comply with a 
grand jury summons); In re Pi Bella, 518 F.2d 955 (2d Cir. 1975) 
AUnlike those courts which have held that matters of civil 
non-support are rudimentary and straightforward, the court in 
McLain found that the issues in a non-support proceeding are seldom 
straightforward and that counsel will be assistance in insuring the 
accuracy and fairness of the proceeding. McLain at 1184. 
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(grand jury summons); In re Kilqo, 484 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1973) 
(grand jury summons); In re Grand Jury Proceedings: U.S. v. Sun 
Kung Rang, 468 F.2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1972) (grand jury summons). 
In the instant case, the trial court specifically found that 
this Appellant is capable of earning up to $2,000.00, so there 
was no finding of indigency and clearly a finding of Appellant's 
ability to pay. (R.725). The trial court also specifically 
found that Appellant was underemployed for purposes of avoiding 
his child support obligation. (R.725). Thus, the trial court's 
determination that Appellant be held in contempt and immediately 
begin his jail sentence without appointment of counsel is 
supported by the record. However, even if this court accepts 
Appellant's arguments that he should have been appointed counsel 
and/or allowed to purge himself the issue is now moot. Appellant 
is not making any claims for damages, resulting specifically from 
the contempt order, and the contempt order is now complete, thus 
there is nothing to be gained by Appellant through consideration 
of this issue. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 236 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994), See also Sanders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574, 
577 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) which holds that a case is moot when the 
requested relief cannot effect the rights of the litigants. 
POINT VII. 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING FALSIFICATION OF COURT 
RECORD AND RULE 11 SANCTIONS ARE TOTALLY WITHOUT MERIT 
AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR AUTHORITY. 
Appellant for the first time raises claims of falsification 
of record and arguments regarding Rule 11 before this court in 
his points 13 and 14. The arguments are blatantly unmeritorious. 
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Appellant cites no authority for his positions or either cites 
authority that is totally unrelated to facts in the record. 
Therefore, such arguments should be summarily rejected by this 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court properly addressed and dismissed all of the 
claims set forth by Appellant regarding due process, violation of 
the provisions of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah Constitution 
and Utah law. The lower court also properly specifically 
outlined its findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon 
the record and the law. Thus, the August 19, 1994 order by the 
court should be upheld and Appellant's appeal should be 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this £2- day of August, 1994. [ ftli 
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RIGHT TO WORK LAW 34-34-4 
34-34-2. Public policy. 
Jt is hereby declared to be the public policy of the state of Utah that the 
right of persons to work, whether in private employment or for the state, its 
counties, cities, school districts, or other political subdivisions, shall not be 
denied or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor 
anion, labor organization or any other type of association; and further, that 
the right to live includes the right to work. The exercise of the right to work 
jimst be protected and maintained free from undue restraints and coercion. 
?Hlfltory: C. 1953, 34-34-2, enacted by L. 
909, ch. 85, § 144. 
Bbor 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
tlur. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 22. 
Relations § 12. Key Numbers. — Labor Relations •=» 14. 
SB-34-3. "Employer" defined. 
pHe word "employer" as used in this chapter includes all persons, firms, 
~ aciations, corporations, the state, its counties, cities, school districts and 
er political subdivisions. 
fcUiStO] >ry: C. 1953, 34-34-3, enacted by L. 
>, ch. 85, § 145. 
HS-34-4. Agreement, understanding or practice denying 
right to work declared illegal. 
JKny express or implied agreement, understanding or practice between any 
ioyer and any labor union, labor organization or any other type of associa-
whereby any person not a member of such union, organization or any 
iher type of association shall be denied the right to work for an employer, or 
^reby membership in such labor union, labor organization or any other 
of association is made a condition of employment or continuation of 
jployment by such employer, or whereby any such union, organization or 
JQrother type of association acquires an employment monopoly in any enter-
jiie or industry, is hereby declared to be an illegal combination or conspiracy 
[JjL'against public policy. 
gfttory: C. 1953, 34-34-4, enacted by L. 
ch. 85, § 146. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
iction and application. Utah 2d 99. 368 P.2d 912 (1962). 
•unty employees who are fired by a newly The phrase "any other tvpe of association" 
Republican county commissioner on the does not include political parties. Anderson v. 
that they are members of the Demo- Utah County, 13 Utah 2d 99, 368 P 2d 912 
p party cannot contain reinstatement un- (1962). 
£his section. Anderson v. Utah County, 13 
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34-34-5 LABOR IN GENERAL 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 48 Am. Jur. 2d Labor and C.J.S. — 51 C.J.S. Labor Relations § 22. 
Labor Relations § 12. Key Numbers. — Labor Relations «=» 44. 
34-34-5. Any agreement, understanding or practice de-
signed to violate chapter declared illegal. 
Any express or implied agreement, understanding or practice which is de-
signed to cause or require, or has the effect of causing or requiring, any 
employer or labor union, labor organization or any other type of association, 
whether or not a party thereto, to violate any provision of this chapter is 
hereby declared an illegal agreement, understanding, or practice and contrary 
to public policy. 
History: C. 1953, 34-34-5, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 147. 
34-34-6. Conduct forcing violation of act illegal — Peace-
ful and orderly solicitation excepted. 
Any person, firm, association, corporation, labor union, labor organization 
or any other type of association engaging in lockouts, layoffs, boycotts, picket-
ing, work stoppages, or other conduct, a purpose of which is to compel or force 
any other person, firm, association, corporation, labor union, labor organiza-
tion or any other type of association to violate any provision of this chapter 
shall be guilty of illegal conduct contrary to public policy; but nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to prevent or make illegal the peaceful and 
orderly solicitation and persuasion by members of a labor union, labor organi-
zation or any other type of association of others to join a labor union, labor 
organization or any other type of association, unaccompanied by any intimida-
tion, use of force, threat of use of force, reprisal, or threat of reprisal. 
History: C. 1953, 34-34-6, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 148. 
34-34-7. Compelling person to join or not join labor union 
unlawful. 
It shall be unlawful for any employer, person, firm, association, corporation, 
employee, labor union, labor organization or any other type of association, 
officer or agent of such, or member of same, to compel or force, or to attempt to 
compel or force, any person to join or refrain from joining any labor union, 
labor organization or any other type of association. 
History: C. 1953, 34-34-7, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 85, § 149. 
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62A-9-101 HUMAN SERVICES CODE 
Section Section 
62A-9-131. Legal actions — Evidence — 62A-9-134. County attorney and attorney 
Value of benefits. general responsibilities. 
62A-9-101. Legislative purpose. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to provide assistance under appropriate 
programs to any person in this state who is in need as defined by relevant 
federal law, by this chapter, or by rules enacted by the department under this 
chapter. A person is in need and entitled to assistance only if there are not 
sufficient resources available for his use, within the limitations set forth in this 
chapter, and if he otherwise qualifies. Applicants and recipients under this 
chapter shall be encouraged and assisted to achieve economic independence 
and self-sufficiency. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-101, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, made a stylistic 
1888, ch. 1, § 218; 1994, ch. 12, ft 76. change. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
62A-9-104. Office — Creation — Powers and responsibili-
ties. 
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-262 provides 
that the Office of Family Support is repealed 
July 1, 1999. 
62A-9-114. General assistance — Public Assistance. 
(1) Aid to Families with Dependent Children may be provided to families 
and children in accordance with Title IV-A of the Social Security Act and 
applicable federal regulations. 
(2) (a) General Assistance may be provided to individuals who are not 
receiving direct jmoney grants as Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren, or Supplemental Security Income, and who are unemployable 
according to standards promulgated by the department. 
(b) General Assistance may be provided by payment in cash or in kind 
The office may, by rule, limit the grants that are made to General 
Assistance recipients. Those limitations may be made in frequency and 
duration of payments, or by providing an amount less than the existing 
payment level for an otherwise similarly situated recipient of Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children. 
(c) The office shall establish asset limitations for General Assistance 
recipients, similar in kind to the limitations described in Section 62A-9-
117, but which may differ as to quantity, amount, or value. 
(d) General Assistance may be granted to meet special nonrecurrent 
needs of recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and to 
applicants for the federal Supplemental Security Income program, if they 
agree to reimburse the department for assistance advanced while await-
ing the determination of eligibility by the Social Security Administration. 
Other than for the optional state supplementation made under the Social 
Security Act, no General Assistance payments may be made to current 
recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children or Supplemental 
Security Income. 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 62A-9-121 
(e) Public assistance may include payment for the reasonable cost of 
burial for recipients, if heirs or relatives are not financially able to assume 
this expense, and the county is determined not to be liable for the expense 
under Section 17-5-250. However, if the bodies of these persons are 
unclaimed, Section 53B-17-301 is applicable thereto. The office shall fix 
the costs of a reasonable burial and conditions under which burial 
expenditures may be made. 
(3) Assistance may be provided to persons in need who are transients. That 
assistance may be designated under any of the foregoing public assistance 
programs for which they would otherwise qualify. 
£ (4) The office may cooperate with any governmental unit or agency, or any 
private nonprofit agency in establishing work projects to provide employment 
for employable persons. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-114, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "Sec-
1988, ch. 1, § 231; 1988, ch. 242, § 22; 1994, tion 17-5-250w for "Section 17-5-67* in Subsec-
Bh.147, § 98. tion(2Xe). 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
62A-9-121. Assignment of support. 
(1) (a) The department shall obtain an assignment of support from each 
applicant or recipient regardless of whether the payment is court ordered. 
(b) Any right to support from any other person that has accrued at the 
time the assignment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of 
application for assistance, passes to the department upon the receipt of 
assistance, even if the recipient has not executed and delivered an 
assignment to the department. 
(c) The right to support described in Subsection (b) includes a right to 
support in the applicant's or recipient's own behalf or in behalf of any 
family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying for or 
receiving assistance. 
(2) An assignment of support or a passing of rights by operation of law 
includes payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this 
state, any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and 
shall not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment. 
(3) When an assignment is executed or the right to support passes to the 
department by operation of law, the applicant or recipient is entitled to regular 
monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund. 
(4) All sums refunded, except any amount which is required to be credited 
to the federal government, shall be retained by the department for use in the 
administration of this section and for other authorized activities. Under this 
section authorized activity includes, but is not limited to, the use of refunded 
sums to obtain legal services where deemed necessary by the department, to 
enforce this section, Title 78, Chapters 45 and 45a, as well as any other 
statutes designated by the department. 
History: C. 1953,62A-9-121, enacted by L. tion (1) to clarify the provision as to the right to 
1988, ch. 1, § 238; 1989, ch. 22, § 40; 1994, support; inserted "or the right to support 
ch. 140, § 1. passes to the department by operation of law" 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- in Subsection (3); and made stylistic changes. 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec-
67 
RECOVERY SERVICES 62A-11-106 
ftftA-11-104.1. Disclosure of information regarding em-
ployees. 
liT Upon request by the office, for purposes of an official investigation made 
^connection with its duties under Section 62A-11-104, the following disclo-
sures shall be made to the office: 
(a) a public or private employer shall disclose an employee's name, 
address, date of birth, income, social security number, and health insur-
ance information pertaining to the employee and his dependents; 
(b) an insurance organization subject to Title 31A, Insurance Code, or 
the insurance administrators of a self-insured employer shall disclose 
health insurance information pertaining to an insured or an insured's 
dependents, if known; and 
(c) a financial institution subject to Title 7, Financial Institutions Act of 
1981, shall disclose financial record information of a customer named in 
the request. 
£2)~The office shall specify by rule the type of health insurance and financial 
_ Drd information required to be disclosed under this section. 
~(S) All information received under this section is subject to Title 63, Chapter 
^.Government Records Access and Management Act. 
£4) An employer, financial institution, or insurance organization, or its 
it or employee, is not civilly or criminally liable for providing information 
Fto the office in accordance with this section, whether the information is 
*E$&vided pursuant to oral or written request. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-104.1, enacted became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to 
I*y L. 1994, ch. 140, § 2. Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 140 
62A-11-106. Office may file as real party in interest — 
Written consent to payment agreements — 
Money judgment in favor of obligee considered 
to be in favor of office to extent of right to 
recover. 
(1) The office may file judicial proceedings as a real party in interest to 
establish, modify, and enforce a support order in the name of the state, any 
department of the state, the office, or an obligee. 
J2) No agreement between an obligee and an obligor as to past, present, or 
future obligations, reduces or terminates the right of the office to recover from 
that obligor on behalf of the department for public assistance provided, unless 
the department has consented to the agreement in writing. 
(3) Any court order that includes a money judgment for support to be paid 
to an obligee by any person is considered to be in favor of the office to the extent 
of the amount of the office's right to recover public assistance from the 
judgment debtor. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-106, enacted by past, present, or future obligations* for "either 
L. 1988, ch. 1,1 269; 1989, ch. 62, § 3; 1994, relieving an obligation or purporting to settle 
ch; 140, § 3. past, present, or future obligations, either as 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- settlement or prepayment* in Subsection (2) 
Bient, effective May 2, 1994, substituted "as to and made a stylistic change in Subsection (1). 
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PART 3 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
62A-11-301. Short title. 
This part shall be known as the "Public Support of Children Act." 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-301, enacted by Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support 
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 286. Act, § 77-31-1 et seq. 
Cross-References. — Uniform Civil Liabil-
ity for Support Act, § 78-45-1 et seq. 
62 A-11-302. Common-law and statutory remedies 
augmented — Public policy. 
The state of Utah, exercising its police and sovereign power, declares that 
the common-law and statutory remedies pertaining to family desertion and 
nonsupport of minor dependent children shall be augmented by this part, 
which is directed to the real and personal property resources of the responsible 
parents. In order to render resources more immediately available to meet the 
needs of minor children, it is the legislative intent that the remedies provided 
in this part are in addition to, and not in lieu of, existing law. It is declared to 
be the public policy of this state that this part be liberally construed and 
administered to the end that children shall be maintained from the resources 
of responsible parents, thereby relieving or avoiding, at least in part, the 
burden often borne by the general citizenry through public assistance pro-
grams. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-302, enacted by 
L. 1988, ch. 1, § 287. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Family 
Law, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 270. 
62A-11-303. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an action or proceeding of the 
office conducted in accordance with Section 63-46b-l. 
(2) "Administrative order" means an order that involves payment or 
collection of support that has been issued by the office, the department, or 
an administrative agency of another state or other comparable jurisdic-
tion with similar authority to that of the office. 
(3) "Assistance" or "public assistance" means assistance for Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, public funds expended for the reason-
able and necessary health and dental care of a dependent child, and pub-
lic resources used for the benefit of a person, whether specified as finan-
cial aid, services, or otherwise. 
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RECOVERY SERVICES 62A-11-304.3 
PART 3 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
62A-11-304.2. Issuance and modification of administra-
tive order — Compliance with court order — 
Authority of office — Stipulated agreements — 
Interest — Notification requirements. 
(1) Through an adjudicative proceeding the office may issue or modify an 
administrative order, based on the criteria outlined in Section 62A-11-304.3, 
that: 
(a) determines whether an obligor owes support; 
(b) requires an obligor to pay a specific or determinable amount of 
present and future support; 
(c) determines the amount of past due support; and 
(d) renews an administrative judgment. The office shall commence an 
adjudicative proceeding to renew a judgment by serving notice of agency 
action on the obligor before the judgment is barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
(2) If a court order has been issued, the office may not issue an order under 
Subsection (1) that is not based on the court order. 
(3) The office may proceed under this section in the name of tha state, any 
department of the state, the office, or the obligee. 
(4) The office may accept voluntary acknowledgment of a support obligation 
and enter into stipulated agreements providing for the issuance of an admin-
istrative order under this part. 
(5) The office may act in the name of the obligee in endorsing and cashing 
any drafts, checks, money orders, or other negotiable instruments received by 
the office for support. 
(6) The office may assess interest not to exceed 1% per month on any unpaid 
support if notice of the assessment of interest has been provided to the obligor 
in a notice of agency action. 
(7) The obligor shall, after a notice of agency action has been served on him 
under this part, keep the office informed of: 
(a) his current address; 
(b) the name and address of current payors of income; 
(c) availability of or access to health insurance coverage; and 
(d) applicable health insurance policy information. 
History: C. 1953, 62A-11-304.2, enacted under Subsection (1) that is not based on a 
by L. 1989, ch. 62, § 10; 1994, ch. 140, § 5. court order and rewrote Subsection (7), which 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- read "The obligor shall notify the office of any 
ment, effective May 2,1994, deleted provisions change of address or employment that occurs 
in Subsection (2) setting forth conditions re- after a notice of agency action has been prop-
quired for issuance by the office of an order erly served on him under this part* 
62A-11-304.3. Administrative order — Basis. 
(1) If a court order does not exist, the office shall base its administrative 
order on support guidelines established in accordance with the Family Support 
Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. Section 1305 et seq. 
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(2) All funds appropriated or collected for publishing the divisions publica-
tions shall be nonlapsing. 
History: C. 1953,63-46a-10, enacted by L. Subsection (l)(e), which read: "publish court 
1985, ch. 158, § 1; 1987, ch. 241, § 10; 1991, rules and proposals for court rules as denned in 
ch. 177, § 3; 1992, ch. 146, § 2; 1993, ch. 282, Section 36-20-1 when they are made available 
§ 9; 1994, ch. 24, § 1. to members of the bar and the public for public 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- comment," and redesignated the subsequent 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, deleted former subsections accordingly 
CHAPTER 46b 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ACT 
Section Section 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chap- 63-46b-15. Judicial review — Informal ad-
ter. judicative proceedings. 
63-46b-l. Scope and applicability of chapter. 
(1) Except as set forth in Subsection (2), and except as otherwise provided by 
a statute superseding provisions of this chapter by explicit reference to this 
chapter, the provisions of this chapter apply to every agency of the state and 
govern: 
(a) all state agency actions that determine' the legal rights, duties, 
privileges, immunities, or other legal interests of one or more identifiable 
persons, including all agency actions to grant, deny, revoke, suspend, 
modify, annul, withdraw, or amend an authority, right, or license; and 
(b) judicial review of these actions. 
(2) This chapter does not govern: 
(a) the procedures for making agency rules, or the judicial review of 
those procedures or rules; 
(b) the issuance of any notice of a deficiency in the payment of a tax, the 
decision to waive penalties or interest on taxes, the imposition of and 
penalties or interest on taxes, or the issuance of any tax assessment, 
except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by a 
taxpayer or by another person authorized by law to contest the validity or 
correctness of those actions; 
(c) state agency actions relating to extradition, to the granting of 
pardons or parole, commutations or terminations of sentences, or to the 
rescission, termination, or revocation of parole or probation, to actions and 
decisions of the Psychiatric Security Review Board relating to discharge, 
conditional release, or retention of persons under its jurisdiction, to the 
discipline of, resolution of grievances of, supervision of, confinement of, or 
the treatment of inmates or residents of any correctional facility, the Utah 
State Hospital, the Utah State Developmental Center, or persons in the 
custody or jurisdiction of the Division of Mental Health, or persons on 
probation or parole, or judicial review of those actions; 
(d) state agency actions to evaluate, discipline, employ, transfer, reas-
sign, or promote students or teachers in any school or educational 
institution, or judicial review of those actions; 
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(e) applications for employment and internal personnel actions within 
an agency concerning its own employees, or judicial review of those 
actions: 
(f) the issuance of any citation or assessment under Title 35, Chapter 9, 
Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act, and Title 58, Chapter 55, Utah 
Construction Trades Licensing Act, except that this chapter governs any 
agency action commenced by the employer, licensee, or other person 
authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the citation or 
assessment; 
(g) state agency actions relating to management of state funds, the 
management and disposal of school and institutional trust land assets, 
except that this chapter governs any agency's final action commenced by 
any person pursuant to Section 65A-1-7, and contracts for the purchase or 
sale of products, real property, supplies, goods, or services by or for the 
state, or by or for an agency of the state, except as provided in those 
contracts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(h) state agency actions under Title 7, Chapter 1, Article 3, Powers and 
Duties of Commissioner of Financial Institutions; and Title 7, Chapter 2, 
Possession of Depository Institution by Commissioner; Title 7, Chapter 19, 
Acquisition of Failing Depository Institutions or Holding Companies; and 
Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or judicial review 
of those actions; 
(i) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for unemploy-
ment benefits, the initial determination of any person's eligibility for 
benefits under Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation, and Title 35, 
Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease Act, or the initial determination of 
a person's unemployment tax liability; 
(j) state agency actions relating to the distribution or award of mone-
tary grants to or between governmental units, or for research, develop-
ment, or the arts, or judicial review of those actions; 
(k) the issuance of any notice of violation or order under Title 26, 
Chapter 8, Utah Emergency Medical Services System Act; Title 19, 
Chapter 2, Air Conservation Act; Title 19, Chapter 4, Safe Drinking Water 
Act; Title 19, Chapter 5, Water Quality Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 1, 
Solid and Hazardous Waste Act; Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 4, Underground 
Storage Tank Act; or Title 19, Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management 
Act, except that this chapter governs any agency action commenced by any 
person authorized by law to contest the validity or correctness of the notice 
or order; 
(1) state agency actions, to the extent required by federal statute or 
regulation to be conducted according to federal procedures; 
(m) the initial determination of any person's eligibility for government 
or public assistance benefits; 
(n) state agency actions relating to wildlife licenses, permits, tags, and 
certificates of registration; 
(o) licenses for use of state recreational facilities; and 
(p) state agency actions under Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records 
Access and Management Act, except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
(3) This chapter does not affect any legal remedies otherwise available to: 
(a) compel an agency to take action; or 
(b) challenge an agency's rule. 
59 
63-46b-l STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative pro-
ceeding from: 
(a) requesting or ordering conferences with parties and interested 
persons to: 
(1) encourage settlement; 
(ii) clarify the issues; 
(hi) simplify the evidence: 
(iv) facilitate discovery; or 
(v) expedite the proceedings; or 
(b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary judgment if the 
requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56, respectively, of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the 
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
(5) (a) Declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 63-46b-21 are not 
governed by this chapter, except as explicitly provided in that section.-
(b) Judicial review of declaratory proceedings authorized by Section 
63-46b-21 are governed by this chapter. 
(6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting rules affecting 
or governing adjudicative proceedings or from following any of those rules, if 
the rules are enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rules conform to the 
requirements of this chapter. 
(7) (a) If the attorney general issues a written determination that any 
provision of this chapter would result in the denial of funds or services to 
an agency of the state from the federal government, the applicability of 
those provisions to that agency shall be suspended to the extent necessary 
to prevent the denial. 
(b) The attorney general shall report the suspension to the Legislature 
at its next session. 
(8) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to provide an independent 
basis for jurisdiction to review final agency action. 
(9) Nothing in this chapter may be interpreted to restrict a presiding officer, 
for good cause shown, from lengthening or shortening any time period 
prescribed in this chapter, except those time periods established for judicial 
review 
History: C. 1963, 63-46b-l, enacted by L. in Subsection (2)(k); and made stylistic and 
1987, ch. 161, § 257; 1988, ch. 72, § 15; 1990, punctuation changes throughout the section, 
ch. 306, § 2; 1991, ch. 207, § 39; 1991, ch. The 1994 amendment by ch. 200, effective 
212, § 5; 1991, ch. 259, § 51; 1992, ch. 30, June 1,1994, deleted "Title 7, Chapter 8a, Utah 
§ 128; 1992, ch. 280, § 57; 1992, ch. 303, Industrial Loan Corporation Guaranty Act," 
§ 12; 1993, ch. 91, § 1; 1994, ch. 40, § 4; 1994,
 n e a r t n e middle of Subsection (2Xh) and made 
ch. 200, § 86; 1994, ch. 297, § 13.
 s t y l i f l t l c changes. 
Amendment Notes. - T h e 1994 amend-
 T h e 1 9 9 4 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 297, effective 
IT; blrtl °A e f f e C t l V e *? a £ 2 , 1 9 9 4 ; *$"?' July 1. 1994, made stylistic and punctuation 
n ? t n Occupational Disease Act for
 c h m S u b s e c t l o n s (2)(f)> (h)> (i)f ^ (k) 
Utah Occupational Disability LaV in Subsec-
 a n d ^ ^ UQT M 1 9 c h ^ 6 P a r t 4> 
£ ™ * J ^ ? ^ ± ^ Underground Storage Tank Act" in Subsectum Conservation Act" for 'Title 19, Chapter 5 (2)(k). Water Quality Act" and 'Title 19, Chapter 5, v ^ . „ . , . ,. 
Water Quality Act" for "Title 19, Chapter 2, Air T*18 8fTtlon l s s e t °^ a s r*conaled by the 
Conservation Act, or" and inserted "or Title 19, 0 f f i c e o f Legislative Research and General 
Chapter 6, Part 7, Used Oil Management Act" co\mael 
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tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition for review 
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n 
v Board of State Lands, 869 P2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Subdivision (3)(e)(m) confers jurisdiction in 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and 
decrees that originate in formal adjudicative 
proceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
Certiorari. 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court: therefore, the bnefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 R2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 R2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AXJR. — Sexual partner's tort liability to Parent's child support liability as affected by 
other partner for fraudulent misrepresentation other parent's fraudulent misrepresentation re-
regardmg stenlity or use of birth control result- gardmg stenlity or use of birth control, or 
ing in pregnancy, 2 A L R 5th 301 refusal to abort pregnancy, 2 A.L.R,5th 337. 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebutta-
ble guidelines. 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior 
court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on 
the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the pnor court order contains a stipulated provision for the 
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support 
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a material 
change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for support which equals or exceeds the base child 
support award required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the obligor's 
voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no pnor court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court 
shall establish support after considenng all relevant factors, including but not 
limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of 
others. 
(4) When no pnor court order exists, the court shall determine and assess all 
arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines described in this 
chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 7; 1977, ch. have been reasonably and necessarily ex-
145, § 10; 1984, ch. 13, § 2; 1989, ch. 214, § 3; pended in support of spouse and children" at 
1990, ch. 100, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 2; 1994, the end of Subsection (4). 
ch. 140, § 14. The 1994 amendment by ch. 118, effective 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- July 1, 1994, designated former Subsection (1) 
mentbych 140, effective May 2, 1994. substi- as Subsection (l)(a) and added Subsection 
tuted "the Uniform Child Support Guidelines (1Kb). 
descnbed in this chapter" for "but not limited This section is set out as reconciled by the 
to: (a) the amount of public assistance received Office of Legislative Research and General 
by the obligee, if any; and (b) the funds that Counsel. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
fication of support. 
^Application of guidelines. 
s
 3ivorce decree. 
•bdification of support. 
Application of guidelines. 
trial court committed reversible error 
it failed to apply the presumptive guide-
set forth in this chapter and determined 
support outside -Ihe guidelines without 
there were special circumstances that 
d deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 R2d 722 
Ct. App. 1992). 
—Divorce decree. 
Plaintiff was required to file a petition to 
modify her divorce decree under Rule 6-404 of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration when 
she sought to enforce, by order to show cause, a 
provision in the decree that provided that fu-
ture child support would be automatically ad-
justed to reflect changes in income. Such a 
provision violates Subsection (1) of this section, 
which provides that a child support order can 
only be modified based upon a showing of a 
material change in circumstances. Grover v. 
Grover, 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
18-45-7.1. Medical expenses of dependent children — As-
signing responsibility for payment — Insurance 
coverage — Income withholding. 
The court shall include the following in its order: 
(1) a provision assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable 
and necessary medical expenses for the dependent children; 
(2) a provision requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate 
insurance for the medical expenses of dependent children, if coverage is or 
becomes available at a reasonable cost; 
(3) provisions for income withholding, in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(4) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.1, enacted by L. 
1984, ch. 13, § 3; 1990, ch. 166, § 3; 1993, ch. 
261, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 3. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-
ment, effective January 1, 1994, rewrote the 
undesignated introductory paragraph, which 
read "When no prior court order exists or the 
prior court order makes no specific provision for 
the payment of medical and dental expenses for 
dependent children, the court in its order9; 
made several stylistic changes in Subsections 
(1) and (2); and added Subsections (3) and (4). 
The 1994 amendment, effective July 1,1994, 
deleted "and dentar after "medical" in Subsec-
tion (1) and deleted "health, hospital, and den-
tal care" after "appropriate" and inserted "med-
ical expenses" in Subsection (2). 
78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal. 
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing 
or modifying an award of child support entered on or after July 1, 1989. 
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable pre-
sumption in establishing or modifying the amount of temporary or 
permanent child support. 
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(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and consider-
ations required by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the 
application of the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with 
these guidelines are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the 
provisions of this section. 
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the 
conclusion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an 
award amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappro-
priate, or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to 
rebut the presumption in that case. 
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of 
that parent and are not children in common to both parties may at the 
option of either party be taken into account under the guidelines in setting 
or modifying a child support award, as provided in Subsection (5). 
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared that compute the obliga-
tions of the respective parents for the additional children. The obligations 
shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before 
determining the award in the instant case. 
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award, consideration of natural or 
adoptive children other than those in common to both parties may be applied 
to mitigate an increase in the award but may not be applied to justify a 
decrease in the award. 
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment of the guidelines and any 
subsequent change in the guidelines constitutes a substantial or material 
change of circumstances as a ground for modification or adjustment of a court 
order, if there is a difference of at least 25% between the existing order and the 
guidelines. In cases enforced under IV-D of Title IV of the Social Security Act, 
42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., the office may request modification, in accor-
dance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 
100-485, no more often than once every three years. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.2, enacted by L. of Title IV of the Social Secunty Act, 42 U.S.C. 
1989, ch. 214, § 4; 1990, ch. 100, § 3; 1990, Section 601 et seq." for "With regard to IV-D 
ch. 275, § 2; 1994, ch. 118, § 4. cases" at the beginning of the second sentence; 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- and made stylistic changes, 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "and the Federal Law. — The Family Support Act of 
use of worksheets consistent with these guide- 1988, Public Law 100-485, cited in Subsection 
lines" in Subsection (2)(b); m Subsection (6), (6), amended various sections throughout Title 
inserted "or adjustment" in the first sentence IV of the Social Secunty Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et 
and substituted "In cases enforced under IV-D seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Modification of award. child support outside the guidelines without 
The trial court committed reversible error finding there were special circumstancea that 
when it failed to apply the presumptive guide- justified deviation. Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 
lines set forth in this chapter and determined (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
78-45-7,3. Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation. 
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the moving party shall submit: 
(a) a completed ( ild support worksheet; 
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and 
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(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of child 
support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not 
available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by the 
moving party, based on the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only be offered after 
a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Proce-
dures Act, in an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the.financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); 
and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not the amount of 
child support requested is consistent with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review 
the adequacy of a child support order negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined child support and 
alimony is adequate under the guidelines if the stipulated child support 
amount or combined amount equals or exceeds the base child support 
award required by the guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.3, enacted by L. for "exceeds the total" and deleted the former 
1989, ch. 214, § 5; 1990, ch. 100, § 4; 1994, second sentence which read "When the stipu-
ch. 118, 8 5. lated amount exceeds the guideline*, it may be 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- awarded without a finding under Section 78-45-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection 7 2." 
(3Xc), substituted "equals or exceeds the base" 
78-45-7.4. Obligation — Adjusted gross income used. 
Acftusted gross income shall be used in calculating each parent's share of the 
base combined child support obligation. Only income of the natural or adoptive 
parents of the child may be used to determine the award under these 
guidelines. 
History: C. 1953, 78-46-7.4, enacted by JL ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base 
1989, ch. 214, § 6; 1994, ch. 118, § 6. combined child support obligation" for "child 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- support award n 
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed in-
come. 
(1) As used in the guidelines, "gross income" includes: 
(a) prospective income from any source, including noneamed sources, 
except under Subsection (3); and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royalties, bonuses, rents, 
gifts from anyone, pnzes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, 
trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, 
social security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment 
compensation, disability insurance benefits, and payments from 
"nonmeans-tested" government programs. 
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(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the equivalent of one 
full-time job. 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are: 
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC); 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, the Job Training 
Partnership Act, S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; 
and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits received by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall 
be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses required for self-employ-
ment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses 
from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to 
determine an appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those expenses necessary to allow the 
business to operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the 
amount of business income determined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be computed on an annual 
basis and then recalculated to determine the average gross monthly 
income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current income. Each 
parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs or employer statements and 
complete copies of tax returns from at least the most recent year unless the 
court finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verification of 
income from records maintained by the Office of Employment Security 
may be substituted for pay stubs, employer statements, and income tax 
returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to determine whether 
an underemployment or overemployment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent under Subsection 
(7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates 
to the amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the 
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon 
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work history, 
occupation qualifications, and prevailing earnings for persons of similar 
backgrounds in the community. 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at 
least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute a 
greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer 
in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following conditions exist: 
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for the parents' minor children 
approach or equal the amount of income the custodial parent can 
earn; 
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he 
cannot earn minimum wage; 
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to 
establish basic job skills; or 
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(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child require the 
custodial parent's presence in the home. 
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings of a child who is the 
subject of a child support award nor benefits to a child in the child's own 
right such as Supplemental Security Income. 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to the earnings of a 
parent may be credited as child support to the parent upon whose earning 
record it is based, by crediting the amount against the potential obligation 
of that parent. Other unearned income of a child may be considered as 
income to a parent depending upon the circumstances of each case. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.5, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend-
1989, ch. 214, § 7; 1990, ch. 100, § 5; 1994, mem, effective July 1,1994, rewrote Subsection 
ch. 118, § 7. (5)(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS not include a specific finding that ex-husband 
_. was underemployed, because he had acquiesced 
Findings by court. ^
 t h e ^ ^ ^ o f m c o m e a t the ^ l e v e l 
C t^ed m C ° m e * and because his job history and current employ-
1
 ment options inarguably supported this impu-
Findings by court. tation, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
Although a tnal court entered findings re- tion in imputing income m an amount greater 
quired by Subsection 7(b), since the tnal court than the ex-husband's current salary. Hill v. 
failed to enter any findings required under Hill, 229 Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah C t App. 
Subsection (7)(a), the findings on the whole 1993). 
were insufficient. Hall v Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 „ ««-««„ 
(Utah Ct App 1993) Cited in Cummings v. Cummmgs, 821 P.2d 
Imputed income. 
Even though the court's findings of fact did 
472 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
78-45-7.7. Calculation of .obligations. 
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be divided between them in 
proportion to their adjusted gross incomes, unless the low income table is 
applicable. 
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and split custody as defined in 
Section 78-45-2 and in cases where the obligor's adjusted gross income is 
$1,050 or less monthly, the base child support award shall be determined as 
follows: 
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support obli-
gation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
(3) In cases where the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is 
between $650 and $1,050, the base child support award shall be the lesser of 
the amount calculated in accordance with Subsection (2) and the amount 
calculated using the low income table. 
(4) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined 
child support obligations for up to six children. For more than six children, 
additional amounts may be added to the base child support obligation shown. 
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Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), the amount ordered shall not be 
less than the amount which would be ordered for up to six children. 
(5) If the monthly adjusted gross income of the obligor is $649 or less, the 
court or administrative agency shall determine the amount of the child support 
obligation on a case-by-case basis, but the base child support award shall not 
be less than $20. 
(6) The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total 
number of children, not an amount per child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-46-7.7, enacted by L. tion of any monthly payments made directly by 
1989, ch. 214, § 9; 1990, ch. 100, § 6; 1994, each parent for medical and dental insurance 
ch. 118, 5 8. premiums" at the end of Subsection (2Xb); de-
Amendment Notes. — Tile 1994 amend- leted former Subsections (2)(c) and (2Xd) relat-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, added "unless the mg to the calculation of the child support 
low income table is applicable" at the end of award; added present Subsections (3) and (5) 
Subsection (1); inserted "and in cases where the and redesignated the subsections accordingly; 
obligor's adjusted gross income is $1,050 or less
 m present Subsection (4), substituted "six chil-
monthiy and substituted "base" for "total" in dren» for « t e n chiidren" in two places, suhtti-
the introductory language of Subsection (2); tuted "may" for "shall" in the second sentence 
inserted "combmed" the second time the word
 a n d a d d e d t h e ^ d sentence; and made ityus-
appears m Subsection (2Xa); deleted "and sub-
 t l c changes, 
tractmg from the products the children's por-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Watson v Watson, 837 P.2d 1 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992). 
78-45-7.8. Split custody — Obligation calculations. 
In cases of split custody, the base child support award shall be determined as 
follows: 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount 
between the parents in proportion to the number of children for whom 
each parent has physical custody. The amounts so calculated are a 
tentative base child support obligation due each parent from the other 
parent for support of the child or children for whom each parent has 
physical custody. 
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support obligation due each parent 
by the percentage that the other parent's adjusted gross income bears to 
the total combined adjusted gross income of both parents. 
(3) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection (2) from the larger amount 
to determine the base child support award to be paid by the parent with 
the greater financial obligation. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.8, enacted by L. deleted former Subsection (3) relating to sub-
1989, ch. 214, § 10; 1990, ch. 100, § 7; 1994, traction of payments for medical and dental 
ch. 118, § 9. insurance premiums; redesignated former Sub-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- section (4) as Subsection (3); deleted former 
ment, effective July 1,1994, substituted "base" Subsections (5) and (6) relating to allocation of 
for "total" in the introductory language; in- combmed monthly work related child care costs 
serted "combined" the second time the word and calculation of the total child support 
appears in the first sentence of Subsection (1); award; and made stylistic changes. 
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78-45-7.9. Joint physical custody — Obligation calcula-
tions. 
In cases of joint physical custody, the base child support award shall be 
determined as follows. 
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the parents and determine 
the base combined child support obligation using the base combined child 
support obligation table. 
(2) Calculate each parent's proportionate share of the base combined 
child support obligation by multiplying the base combined child support 
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income. 
The amounts so calculated are a tentative base child support obligation 
due from each parent for support of the children. 
(3) Multiply each parent's tentative base child support obligation by the 
percentage of time the children spend with the other parent to determine 
each parent's tentative obligation to the other parent. 
(4) Calculate the base child support award to be paid by the obligor by 
subtracting the lesser amount calculated in Subsection (3) from the larger 
amount. 
(5) The parent determined to be the obligor in Subsection (4) shall pay 
the amount calculated in Subsection (4) when the obligee has physical 
custody. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-7.9, enacted by L. made for medical and dental insurance premi-
1989, ch. 214, § 11; 1990, ch. 100, § 8; 1994, urns; redesignated former Subsection (5) as 
ch. 118, § 10. Subsection (4), deleted former Subsection (6) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- relating to allocation of the combined work 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "base" related child care cost of the parents; redesig-
for "total" in the introductory language; in- nated former Subsection (7) as Subsection (5) 
serted "combined" the second time the word and rewrote the provision; deleted former Sub-
appears in Subsection (1), inserted "base" the section (8) which read "Include the amounts 
second time the word appears in the first sen- determined in Subsections (7Xa) and (b) and 
tence of Subsection (2), deleted former Subsec- the two total child support awards in the child 
tion (4) relating to subtraction of payments support order"; and made stylistic changes. 
78-45-7.10. Reduction when child becomes 18. 
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school 
during the child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs 
later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to reflect the lower 
base combined child support obligation shown in the table for the remaining 
number of children due child support, unless otherwise provided in the child 
support order. 
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the 
base child support award originally ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.10, enacted by L. graduated from high school during the child's 
1989, ch. 214, § 12; 1994, ch. 118, § 11. normal and expected year of graduation, which-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- ever occurs later" and deleted "combined" be-
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or has fore "child support award" in Subsection (1). 
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78-45-7.11. Reduction for extended visitation. 
(1) The child support order shall provide that the base child support award 
be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during which the child is with 
the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement of the 
parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a 
recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the 
parties for reduction of child support during extended visitation shall be 
approved by the administrative agency. However, normal visitation and 
holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an interruption of 
the consecutive day requirement. 
(2) For purposes of this section the per child amount to which the abatement 
applies shall be calculated by dividing the base child support award by the 
number of children included in the award. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.11, enacted by L. of any 30 consecutive days" at the end of the 
1989, ch. 214, § 13; 1990, ch. 100, § 9; 1994, first sentence and substituted the second and 
ch. 118, § 12. third sentences for "Only the base child support 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- award ia affected by the 50% abatement The 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, in Subsection (1), amount to be paid for work related child care 
substituted the language beginning "which the costs may be suspended if the costa are not 
child is" for "which the order grants specific incurred during the extended visitation." 
extended visitation for that child for at least 25 
78-45-7.12. Income in excess of tables. 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level specified in 
the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be ordered on a 
case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than the highest 
level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.12, enacted by L. ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "shall" 
1989, ch. 214,1 14; 1994, ch. 118, § 13. for "may" and inserted "on a case-by-case ba-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- sis." 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
78-45-7.13. Advisory committee — Membership and func-
tions. 
(1) On or before March 1, 1995, and every fourth year subsequently, the 
governor shall appoint an advisory committee consisting of: 
(a) two representatives recommended by the Office of Recovery Ser-
vices; 
(b) two representatives recommended by the Judicial Council; 
(c) two representatives recommended by the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion; and 
(d) an uneven number of additional persons, not to exceed five, who 
represent diverse interests related to child support issues, as the governor 
may consider appropriate. However, none of the individuals appointed 
under this subsection may be members of the Utah State Bar Association. 
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(2) (a) The advisory committee shall review the child support guidelines to 
ensure their application results in the determination of appropriate child 
support award amounts. 
(b) The committee shall report to the Legislative Judiciary Interim 
Committee on or before October 1 in 1989 and 1991, and then on or before 
October 1 of every fourth year subsequently. 
(c) The committee's report shall include recommendations of the major-
ity of the committee, as well as specific recommendations of individual 
members of the committee. 
(3) The committee members serve without compensation. Staff for the 
committee shall be provided from the existing budgets of the Department of 
Human Services and the Judicial Council. The committee ceases to exist no 
later than the date the subsequent committee under this section is appointed. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.13, enacted by L. "March 1, 1995" for "May 1, 1989 and May 1, 
1989, ch. 214, i 15; 1990, ch. 183, § 58; 1994, 1991" and deleted "then on or before May 1 o r 
ch* 118, § 14. before "every fourth year" in the introductory 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- language of Subsection (1). 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted 
78-45-7.14. Base combined child support obligation table 
and low income table. 
The following includes the Base Combined Child Support Obligation Table 
and the Low Income Table: 
BASE COMBINED CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION TABLE 
(Both Parents) 
Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Number of Children 
1 2 3 4 5 - 6 
From 
650 — 
676 — 
701 — 
726 — 
751 — 
776 — 
801 — 
826 — 
851 — 
876 — 
901 — 
926 — 
951 — 
976 — 
1,001 — 
1,051 — 
1,101 — 
lb 
675 
700 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1,000 
1,050 
1,100 
1,150 
99 
103 
106 
110 
113 
117 
121 
124 
128 
132 
135 
139 
143 
146 
154 
161 
168 
184 
190 
197 
204 
211 
218 
224 
231 
238 
245 
251 
258 
265 
272 
285 
299 
313 
191 
198 
205 
212 
219 
226 
243 
253 
263 
274 
284 
294 
305 
315 
335 
356 
377 
198 
205 
212 
220 
227 
234 
261 
275 
289 
303 
316 
330 
344 
358 
385 
413 
441 
200 
207 
214 
221 
229 
236 
263 
277 
291 
305 
319 
333 
347 
361 
389 
417 
444 
201 
209 
216 
223 
231 
238 
265 
279 
294 
308 
322 
336 
350 
364 
393 
421 
449 
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Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
From lb 
1,151 — 1,200 
1,201 — 1,250 
1,251 — 1,300 
1,301 — 1,350 
1,351 — 1,400 
1,401 — 1,450 
1,451 — 1,500 
1,501 — 1,550 
1,551 — 1,600 
1,601 — 1,650 
1,651 — 1,700 
1,701 — 1,750 
1,751 — 1,800 
1,801 — 1,850 
1,851 — 1,900 
1,901 — 1,950 
1,951 — 2,000 
2,001 — 2,100 
2,101 — 2,200 
2,201 — 2,300 
2,301 — 2,400 
2,401 — 2,500 
2,501 — 2,600 
2,601 — 2,700 
2,701 — 2,800 
2,801 — 2,900 
2,901 — 3,000 
3,001 — 3,100 
3,101 — 3,200 
3,201 — 3,300 
3,301 — 3,400 
3,401 — 3,500 
3,501 — 3,600 
3,601 — 3,700 
3,701 — 3,800 
3,801 — 3,900 
3,901 — 4,000 
4,001 — 4,100 
4,101 — 4,200 
4,201 — 4,300 
4,301 — 4,400 
4,401 — 4,500 
4,501 — 4,600 
4,601 — 4,700 
4,701 — 4,800 
1 2 
176 
183 
190 
198 
205 
212 
2-20 
227 
234 
242 
249 
256 
264 
271 
278 
286 
293 
308 
319 
328 
336 
345 
354 
362 
371 
380 
388 
397 
406 
414 
423 
431 
438 
444 
451 
458 
465 
472 
479 
486 
493 
499 
506 
513 
520 
326 
340 
353 
367 
381 
394 
408 
421 
435 
449 
462 
476 
489 
503 
517 
530 
544 
571 
592 
608 
625 
641 
658 
674 
691 
707 
724 
740 
756 
773 
789 
804 
817 
830 
843 
856 
870 
883 
896 
909 
923 
936 
949 
962 
975 
Number of Chil( 
3 4 
387 
403 
418 
433 
448 
463 
478 
493 
509 
524 
539 
554 
569 
584 
597 
610 
622 
643 
666 
687 
708 
725 
746 
767 
788 
809 
830 
851 
872 
893 
914 
934 
953 
973 
992 
1,012 
1,031 
1,050 
1,069 
1,088 
1,107 
1,131 
1,150 
1,169 
1,188 
449 
465 
482 
499 
515 
532 
549 
565 
582 
599 
615 
632 
649 
664 
677 
690 
700 
716 
741 
766 
791 
809 
834 
859 
885 
910 
936 
962 
987 
1,013 
1,039 
1,064 
1,090 
1,116 
1,141 
1,167 
1,192 
1,217 
1,242 
1,267 
1,292 
1,326 
1,350 
1,375 
1,400 
5 6 
454 
475 
496 
516 
537 
558 
579 
600 
620 
641 
662 
683 
704 
723 
736 
750 
752 
779 
807 
835 
862 
882 
909 
937 
964 
992 
1,020 
1,048 
1,076 
1,103 
1,131 
1,159 
1,187 
1,215 
1,243 
1,270 
1,297 
1,325 
1,352 
1,379 
1,407 
1,443 
1,470 
1,498 
1,525 
460 
484 
508 
532 
556 
580 
605 
629 
653 
677 
701 
725 
749 
771 
786 
800 
813 
833 
862 
891 
921 
942 
972 
1,001 
1,031 
1,060 
1,090 
1,120 
1,149 
1,179 
1,208 
1,238 
1,268 
1,297 
1,327 
1,356 
1,386 
1,415 
1,444 
1,474 
1,503 
1,541 
1,570 
1,600 
1,629 
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Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income 
From To 
4,801 — 4,900 
4,901 — 5,000 
5,001 — 5,100 
5,101 — 5,200 
5,201 — 5,300 
5,301 — 5,400 
5,401 — 5,500 
5,501 — 5,600 
5,601 — 5,700 
5,701 — 5,800 
5,801 — 5,900 
5,901 — 6,000 
6,001 — 6,100 
6,101 — 6,200 
6,201 — 6,300 
6,301 — 6,400 
6,401 — 6,500 
6,501 — 6,600 
6,601 — 6,700 
6,701 — 6,800 
6,801 — 6,900 
6,901 — 7,000 
7,001 — 7,100 
7,101 — 7,200 
7,201 — 7,300 
7,301 — 7,400 
7,401 — 7,500 
7,501 — 7,600 
7,601 — 7,700 
7,701 — 7,800 
7,801 — 7,900 
7,901 — 8,000 
8,001 — 8,100 
8,101 — 8,200 
8,201 — 8,300 
8,301 — 8,400 
8,401 — 8,500 
8,501 — 8,600 
8,601 — 8,700 
8,701 — 8,800 
8,801 — 8,900 
8,901 — 9,000 
9,001 — 9,100 
9,101 — 9,200 
9,201 — 9,300 
1 2 
527 
534 
541 
547 
554 
561 
568 
575 
582 
586 
591 
596 
601 
605 
610 
615 
620 
624 
629 
629 
673 
680 
687 
694 
701 
706 
710 
715 
719 
723 
728 
732 
737 
741 
746 
750 
755 
759 
763 
768 
772 
777 
781 
786 
790 
989 
1,002 
1,015 
1,028 
1,042 
1,055 
1,068 
1,081 
1,093 
1,103 
1,112 
1,122 
1,131 
1,141 
1,150 
1,159 
1,169 
1,178 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,188 
1,189 
1,197 
1,205 
1,213 
1,220 
1,228 
1,236 
1,244 
1,252 
1,259 
1,267 
1,275 
1,283 
1,291 
1,298 
1,306 
1,314 
1,322 
1,330 
1,337 
Number of Chile 
3 4 
1,207 
1,226 
1,245 
1,264 
1,282 
1,300 
1,317 
1,335 
1,351 
1,367 
1,383 
1,398 
1,414 
1,430 
1,445 
1,461 
1,480 
1,495 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,511 
1,520 
1,531 
1,541 
1,551 
1,562 
1,572 
1,582 
1,592 
1,603 
1,613 
1,623 
1,633 
1,644 
1,654 
1,664 
1,675 
1,685 
1,695 
1,705 
1,716 
1,726 
1,425 
1,450 
1,475 
1,500 
1,522 
1,544 
1,566 
1,588 
1,610 
1,632 
1,653 
1,675 
1,697 
1,719 
1,740 
1,762 
1,791 
1,812 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,834 
1,841 
1,853 
1,864 
1,876 
1,887 
1,899 
1,911 
1,922 
1,934 
1,945 
1,957 
1,969 
5 6 
1,552 
1,580 
1,607 
1,634 
1,658 
1,682 
1,706." 
1,730 
1,754 
1,778 
1,802 
1,826 
1,850 
1,874 
1,897 
1,921 
1,951 
1,975 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
1,998 
2,000 
2,013 
2,026 
2,039 
2,052 
2,064 
2,077 
2,090 
2,103 
2,116 
2,129 
2,141 
2,154 
2,167 
1,658 
1,687 
1,717 
1,746 
1,772 
1,797 
1,823 
1,848 
1,874 
1,899 
1,925 
1,950 
1,976 
2,001 
2,026 
2,052 
2,084 
2,109 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,134 
2,137 
2,150 
2,164 
2,178 
2,192 
2,206 
2,220 
2,234 
2,247 
2,261 
2,275 
2,289 
2,303 
2,317 
2,330 
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Monthly Combined 
Adj. Gross Income Number of Children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
From 
9,301 — 
9,401 — 
9,501 — 
9,601 — 
9,701 — 
9,801 — 
9,901 — 
10,001 — 
To 
9,400 
9,500 
9,600 
9,700 
9,800 
9,900 
10,000 
10,100 
795 
799 
803 
808 
812 
817 
821 
826 
1,345 
1,353 
1,361 
1,369 
1,376 
1,384 
1,392 
1,400 
1,736 
1,747 
1,757 
1,767 
1,777 
1,788 
1,798 
1,808 
1,980 
1,992 
2,003 
2,015 
2,027 
2,038 
2,050 
2,061 
LOW INCOME TABLE 
(Obligor Parent Only) 
Monthly Adj. 
Gross Income Number of Children 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
From 
650 — 
676 — 
701 — 
726 — 
751 — 
776 — 
801 — 
826 — 
851 — 
876 — 
901 — 
926 — 
951 — 
976 — 
1,001 — 
To 
675 
700 
725 
750 
775 
800 
825 
850 
875 
900 
925 
950 
975 
1,000 
1,050 
23 
45 
68 
90 
113 
23 
46 
68 
91 
114 
137 
159 
182 
205 
228 
250 
23 
46 
69 
92 
115 
138 
161 
184 
207 
230 
253 
276 
299 
23 
47 
70 
93 
116 
140 
163 
186 
209 
233 
256 
279 
302 
326 
372 
24 
47 
71 
94 
118 
141 
165 
188 
212 
235 
259 
282 
306 
329 
376 
24 
48 
71 
95 
119 
143 
166 
190 
214 
238 
261 
285 
309 
333 
380 
History: C. 1963,78-45-7.14, enacted by L. 7 14, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100, 
1994, ch. 118, § 15. § 10, containing the "Base Combined Child 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws Support Obligation Table," and enacts the 
1994, ch. 118, § 15 repeals former § 78-45- present section, effective July 1, 1994. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Baker v. Baker, 226 Utah Adv. Rep. 
27 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
2,180 
2,193 
2,206 
2,218 
2,231 
2,244 
2,257 
2,270 
2,344 
2,358 
2,372 
2,386 
2,400 
2,414 
2,427 
2,441 
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78-45-7.15. Medical expenses. 
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the 
minor children be provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost. 
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for 
medical expenses, the court or administrative agency may consider the: 
(a) reasonableness of the cost; 
(b) availability of a group insurance policy; 
(c) coverage of the policy; and 
(d) preference of the custodial parent. 
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket 
costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of 
insurance. 
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the 
premium actually paid. The premium expense for the children shall be 
calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered 
under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children in the 
instant case. 
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and 
necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, 
incurred for the dependent children and actually paid by the parents. 
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of 
coverage to the other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title 
IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial 
enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or before January 2 of 
each calendar year. The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of 
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 
601 et seq., of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 
calendar days of the date he first knew or should have known of the change. 
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification 
of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days 
of payment. 
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring medical expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if that parent 
fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7). 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 7 15, as last amended by Laws 1990, ch. 100, 
1994, ch. 118, § 16. § l l f relating to medical expenses, and enacts 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws the present section, effective July 1, 1994. 
1994, ch. 118, § 16 repeals former § 78-45-
78-45-7.16. Child care expenses — Expenses not incurred. 
(1) The child support order shall require that each parent share equally the 
reasonable work-related child care expenses of the parents. 
(2) (a) If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin 
paying his share on a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of 
proof of the child care expense, but if the child care expense ceases to be 
incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payment of that 
expense while it is not being incurred, without obtaining a modification of 
the child support order. 
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ft)) (i) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, a parent who 
incurs child care expense shall provide written verification of the cost 
and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other 
parent. 
(ii) In the absence of a court order to the contrary, the parent shall 
notify the other parent of any change of child care provider or the 
monthly expense of child care within 30 calendar days of the date of 
the change. 
(3) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent 
incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the 
expenses or to recover *the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent 
incurring the expenses fails to comply with Subsection (2)(b). 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.16, enacted by L. dent children of the parents shall be specified 
1989, ch. 214, § 18; 1990, cb. 100, § 12; 1994, as a separate monthly amount in the order, 
ch. 118, § 17. "(2) If an actual expense included in an 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- amount specified in the order ceases to be 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, rewrote this sec- incurred, the obligor may suspend, making 
tion which read "(1) The monthly amount to be monthly payment of that expense while it is not 
paid for reasonable work related child care being incurred, without obtaining a modifica-
costs actually incurred on behalf of the depen- tion of the child support order." 
78-45-7.17. Child care costs. 
(1) The need to include child care costs in the child support order is 
presumed, if the custodial parent or the noncustodial parent, during extended 
visitation, is working and actually incurring the child care costs. 
(2) The need to include child care costs is not presumed, but may be awarded 
on a case-by-case basis, if the costs are related to the career or occupational 
training of the custodial parent, or if otherwise ordered by the court in the 
interest of justice. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.17, enacted by L. tion" in Subsection (1); added "or if otherwise 
1989, ch. 214, § 19; 1994, ch. 118, § 18. ordered by the court in the interest of justice* at 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- the end of Subsection (2); and made stylistic 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or the changes, 
noncustodial parent, during extended visita-
78-45-7.18. Limitation on amount of support ordered. 
(1) There is no maximum limit on the base child support award that may be 
ordered using the base combined child support obligation table, using the low 
income table, or awarding medical expenses except under Subsection (2). 
(2) If amounts under either table as provided in Section 78-45-7.14 in 
combination with the award of medical expenses exceeds 50% of the obligor's 
adjusted gross income, or by adding the child care costs, total child support 
would exceed 50% of the obligor's adjusted gross income, the presumption 
under Section 78-45-7.17 is rebutted. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.18, enacted by L. the low income table, or awarding" for ttor for 
1989, ch. 214, § 20; 1990, ch. 100, § 13; 1994, the award of uninsured" in Subsection (1); sub-
ch. 118, § 19. stituted "If amounts under either table as pro-
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- vided in Section 78-45-7.14 in combination with 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, substituted "using the award of medical expenses" for "If the 
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combination of the two amounts under Subsec-
tion (1)" at the beginning of Subsection (2); and 
made stylistic changes. 
78-45-7.19. Determination of parental liability. 
(1) The district court or administrative agency may issue an order deter-
mining the amount of a parent's liability for medical expenses of a dependent 
child when the parent: 
(a) is required by a prior court or administrative order to: 
(i) share those expenses with the other parent of the dependent 
child; or ^ 
(ii) obtain insurance for medical expenses but fails to do so; or 
(b) receives direct payment from an insurer under insurance coverage 
obtained after the prior court or administrative order was issued. 
(2) If the prior court or administrative order does not specify what propor-
tions of the expenses are to be shared, the district court may determine the 
amount of liability as may be reasonable and necessary. 
(3) This section applies to an order without regard to when it was issued. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.19, enacted by L. dental expenses" in the introductory language 
1990, ch. 166, § 4; 1994, ch. 118, § 20. of Subsection (1); substituted "insurance for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- medical expenses" for "medical, hospital, or 
ment, effective July 1, 1994, inserted "or ad- dental care insurance'' in Subsection (D(aXii); 
ministrative agency" and substituted "medical and made a stylistic change, 
expenses" for "uninsured medical, hospital, and 
78-45-7.20. Accountability of support provided to benefit 
child — Accounting. 
(1) The court or administrative agency which issues the initial or modified 
order for child support may, upon the petition of the obligor, order prospectively 
the obligee to furnish an accounting of amounts provided for the child's benefit 
to the obligor, including an accounting or receipts. 
(2) The court or administrative agency may prescribe the frequency and the 
form of the accounting which shall include receipts and an accounting. 
(3) The obligor may petition for the accounting only if current on all child 
support that has been ordered. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.20, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118, § 23 
1994, ch. 118, § 21. makes the act effective on July 1, 1994. 
78-45-7.21. Award of tax exemption for dependent chil-
dren. 
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to 
claim a child or children as exemptions for federal and state income tax 
purposes. Unless the parties otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or 
administrative agency shall award in any final order the exemption on a 
case-by-case basis. 
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall 
consider: 
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(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the 
cost of raising the child; and 
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may 
not award any exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not 
current m his child support obligation, in which case the court or administra-
tive agency may award an exemption to the custodial parent. 
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will 
result in a tax benefit to that parent. 
History: C. 1953,78-45-7.21, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 118,5 23 
1994, ch. 118, § 22. makes the act effective on July 1, 1994. 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and 
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable 
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any 
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance, 
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303C3), to enforce the right to recover 
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right 
of support against the obligor. 
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce 
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the 
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the 
obligee to represent the office. 
(2) (a) A person may not commence an action, file a pleading, or submit a 
written stipulation to the court, without complying with Subsection (2)(b), 
if the purpose or effect of the action, pleading, or stipulation is to: 
(i) establish paternity; 
(ii) establish or modify a support obligation; 
(iii) change the court-ordered manner of payment of support; or 
(iv) recover support due or owing. 
(b) When taking an action described in Subsection (2)(a), a person must 
file an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced, the 
pleading is filed, or the stipulation submitted stating whether public 
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a child who is a 
subject of the action, pleading, or stipulation. If public assistance has been 
or is being provided, the person shall mail a copy of the affidavit and a copy 
of the pleading or stipulation to the office. 
(c) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall 
join the office as a party to the action or mail or deliver a written request 
to the office asking it to join as a party to the action. A copy of that request, 
along with proof of service, shall be filed with the court. The office shall be 
represented as provided in Subsection (l)(b). 
(3) Neither the attorney general nor the county attorney represents or has 
an attorney-client relationship with the obligee or the obligor in carrying out 
the duties arising under this chapter. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 9; 1975, ch. 96, 1989, ch. 62, § 23; 1990, ch. 183, § 59; 1994, 
§ 23; 1977, ch. 145, 8 11; 1982, ch. 63, § 2; ch. 140, § 15. 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 78-45a-5 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- pleading'', added the designation for Subsection 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, rewrote Subsec- (2Kb) and the second sentence in the subsec-
tion (2)(a) which read "A person may not com- tion; redesignated former Subsection (2XW as 
mence any action or file a pleading to establish Subsection (2)(c) ana added the language be-
or modify a support obligation or to recover ginning "or mail or deliver" at the end of the 
support due or owing, whether under this chap- first sentence and inserted the second sentence 
ter or any other applicable statute, without therein; deleted former Subsection (3) which 
filing an affidavit with the court at the time the
 r e a d "As used m this section 'office' means the 
action is commenced or the pleading is filed Office of Recoverv Services within the Depart-
stating whether public assistance has been or is
 raent o f Human Services"; and added Subsec-
bemg provided on behalf of a dependent child of
 t l o n (3) 
the person commencing the action or filing the 
CHAPTER 45a 
UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY 
Section Section 
78-46a-2. Determination of paternity — 78-45a~7 Authority for genetic testing. 
Effect — Enforcement. 78-45a-10 Effect of genetic test results. 
78-45a-5. Remedies. 78-45a-10 5 Visitation rights of father. 
78-45a-2. Determination of paternity — Effect — Enforce-
ment. 
(1) Paternity may be determined upon: 
(a) the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public 
authority chargeable by law with the support of the child; or 
(b) a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in accordance with 
Chapter 45e, Voluntary Declaration of Paternity Act. 
(2) If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to 
the laws of this state or any other state, the liabilities of the father may be 
enforced in the same or other proceedings by: 
(a) the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or may 
furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, 
necessary support, or funeral expenses; and 
(b) other persons including private agencies to the extent that they 
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, edu-
cation, necessary support, or funeral expenses. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, § 2; 1990, ch. tion (1Kb), and designated the second sentence 
245, § 23; 1994, ch. 127, § 2. as Subsection (2), making related stylistic 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- changes and inserting "or any other state" in 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, designated the the introductory language, 
first sentence as Subsection (1), addmg Subsec-
78-45a-5. Remedies. 
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action to establish paternity. All 
remedies for enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and confine-
ment for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses for 
legitimate children shall apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify 
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies 
under Title 77, Chapter 31, Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
are available for enforcement of duties of support under this act. 
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(4) advise the obligee of the available methods for service of process; 
and 
(5) assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a hearing before the 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45-9.2, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Creation of Judicial 
1983, ch. 119, § 1. Council, Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 12; 
Meaning of "this a c t " — The term "this § 78-3-21. 
act," in the introductory language, means General duties of county attorney, i 17-18-1. 
Laws 1983, ch. 119, which enacted this section. Service of process, Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P. 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
Appeals may be taken from orders and judgments under this act as in other 
civil actions. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 10. Cross-References. — Appeals generally, 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under Rules 3 to 13, U.R.A.P. 
same catchline following § 78-45-1. 
78-45-11. Husband and wife privileged communication in-
applicable — Competency of spouses. 
Laws attaching a privilege against the disclosure of communications be-
tween husband and wife are inapplicable under this act. Spouses are compe-
tent witnesses to testify to any relevant matter, including marriage and par-
entage. 
History: L- 1957, ch. 110, § 1 1 . civil actions generally, § 78-24-8; Rule 502, 
Meaning of "this act." — See note under U.R.E. 
9ame catchline following § 78-45-1. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, mar-
Cross-References. — Marital privilege in ital privilege inapplicable to, § 77-31-22. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 81 Am. Jur. 2d Witnesses C.J.S. — 97 C.J.S. Witnesses § 266 et seq. 
§ 148 et seq. Key Numbers. — Witnesses ** 187 et seq. 
78-45-12. Rights are in addition to those presently exist-
ing. 
The rights herein created are in addition to and not in substitution to any 
other rights. 
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, § 12. 
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Attorney General 
PAUL F. GRAF #1229 
Assistant Attorney General 
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201 East 500 North 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA BETH BARKER, and the STATE 
OF UTAH, Department of Human 
Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
C i v i l No. 9085 
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Judge Louis G. Tervort 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER having come on before the court for 
trial on the 30th day of June, 1993, on the State's Order to Show 
Cause, and the State being represented by Paul F. Graf, Assistant 
Attorney General, and the Plaintiff being present and not being 
represented, and the Defendant being present and not being 
represented*; and the matters before the court being the Statefs 
Order To Show Cause, the State's Order in Supplemental Proceedings, 
and the Defendant's various pleadings, being treated by the court 
LAURA BETH BARKER & STATE :>F UTAH v. 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No. 9085 
as a Petition to Modify; and witness having been called, namely, 
Roleen Olsen, Investigator for the Office of Recovery Services; 
Laura Beth Barker [McGillivary], Co-Plaintiff, and Michael Robert 
Barker, Defendant, and arguments being presented by the Defendant, 
Michael Robert Barker, and Paul F. Graf, Attorney for Co-Plaintiff, 
State of Utah, and the matter being submitted to the court based 
upon the evidence presented, and the court, having considered the 
matter, now enters the following: 
JUDGMENT 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the State of Utah 
and against Defendant for unpaid child support arrears in the sum 
of $13,050.00 for the period from March 1, 1991, through January 
31, 1993. 
2. Defendant is adjudged in contempt of court for failure to 
make the child support payments for the period from March 1, 1991, 
through January 31, 199 3, as ordered. 
ORDER 
3. Defendant shall serve 30 days in the Sanpete County jail 
as penalty for his judgment of contempt, said 30 days began 
2 
uAUHA df-TH ^ARKM & 1^ ATL LP TAH v 
MICHAEL x RT ^AnKcR 
JuDGMLNT A D «[JER 
^lVl1 No db 
immediately at the time of the hearing on the 30th day of June, 
1993, Defendant having been remanded to the custody of the sheriff 
by oral order of the court at the conclusion of the trial. 
4. All other prior orders and nudgments in this matter shall 
remain in full force and effect. 
DATEQ^ejlT^53Jg^day of July, 1993^  
rt Judge 
^A^GE^t^kcXCE OF DELIVERY AND MAILING 
Tlir iiT^ i^ j^Jj^ iiiVn i 1 certifies to the court that a copy of 
the foregoing Judgment and Order, mailed to the Michael Barker, c/o 
Sanpete County Jail, 160 North Mam, Manti, UT 84642, on the 9th 
day of July, 199 3; and, on the same date, a copy was also mailed to 
Laura Beth Barker McGillivary, at her last known address. 
Note: The original of said Order will be submitted to the 
Court for signing 10 days after the last mentioned date, pursuant 
to the agreement of the parties at trial. 
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Attorney General 
PAUL F. GRAF #1229 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
201 East 500 North 
Richfield, UT 84701 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
LAURA BETH BARKER, and the STATE 
OF UTAH, Department of Human 
Services, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
Civil No, 9085 
Judge Louis G. Tervort 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER having come on before the court for 
trial on the 16th day of July, 1993, on the Defendant's Motion for 
Court Appointed Counsel and the Defendant's Motion for New Trial 
and Relief From Judgment or Order, and the State being represented 
by Paul F. Graf, Assistant Attorney General, and the Plaintiff 
being present and not being represented, and the Defendant being 
present and not being represented; and the matters before the court 
being the Defendant's Motion for Court Appointed Counsel and the 
.AURA BETH BARKER & ^TATE - -TAH v. 
MICHAEL RC3ERT BARKER 
JUDGMENT AN": CRDER 
C.vil No. 9365 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial and Relief from Judgment or Order, 
and arguments being presented by the Defendant, Michael Robert 
Barker, and Paul F. Graf, Attorney for Co-Plaintiff, State of Utah, 
and the matter being submitted to the court based upon the evidence 
presented, and the court, having considered the matter, now makes 
the following: 
ORDER 
1. Defendant's request for court appointed counsel is hereby 
denied. 
2. 
3. 
Defendant's request for a new trial is hereby denied. 
Defendant's request for relief from the judgment and 
order is hereby denied. 
4. The Defendant is remanded to the Sanpete County Jail to 
serve the remainder of his 30 day sentence. 
5. All other prior orders and judgments in this matter shall 
remain in full force aC^ d effect. 
DATED this /v± Bay of August, 19/3 
w /" " 
^AURA BETH BARKER & STATS I? UTAH v. 
MICHAEL ROBERT BARKER 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
C.vil No. 9065 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY AMD MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies to the court that a copy of 
the foregoing Judgment and Order, mailed to the Michael Barker, Box 
142, Santa Clara, UT, on the f?O day of August, 1993; and, on 
the same date, a copy was also mailed to Laura Beth Barker 
McGillivary, at her last known address 
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